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Before the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Hhddock v. Haddock, was handed down in 1906,
there was a quite general agreement among American courts
that divorce was a proceeding in rem, the res being the mar-
riage status, and that a state in which either party to the re-
lation was domiciled had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage,
even though it acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the
other party.2 The leading case in support of this doctrine, Dit-
son v. Ditson,3 had been followed in many other jurisdictions and
apparently had been approved by the United States Supreme
Court.4 The extent to which this doctrine was modified by the
decision in Haddock v. Haddock was a matter of controversy at
the time that case was decided, 5 has been more or less debated
since that time,6 and is still a question as to which eminent
authorities on the subject of conflict of laws differ.7 If that
decision is to be accepted as controlling the determination of
divorce jurisdiction in the conflict of laws sense, that is, juris-
diction to grant a divorce which other states ought, according
to the common law principles of the conflict of laws, to recog-
nize as valid, then it must be conceded that domicile of one
party is not alone a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. But there
is no general agreement either as to the additional element or
elements that must be present, or as to the theory which re-
quires the presence of the other elements.
If Haddock v. Haddock stood alone it could be very persua-
1201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct 525 (1906).
2 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1891) §§ 136-152.
3 4 R. 1. 87 (1856).
4 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1869); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S.
155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544 (1901).
5 Beale, Constitutional Protection for Divorce (1906) 19 HARV. L. REV.
586; Bigelow, Two Recent Cases on Inter-state Marital Relations (1906)
18 GREEN BAG 348; Schofield, Doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 1
ILL. L. REV. 219; Thurber, Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York (1907)
10 BENCH AND BAR 82.
6 Berger, Extra-Territorial Effect of Decree for Divorce on Constructive
Service (1911) 45 Am. LAW REV. 564; Lewis, Divorce and the Federal
Constitution (1915) 49 Am. LAW REV. 852; Peaslee, Ex Partc Divorce
(1915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 457.
7 Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 417; GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAws (1927) § 127.
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sively argued that it established the principle that both domicile
of one spouse within the state and personal jurisdiction over
the other were essential to give to the court of one state juris-
diction to render a decree of divorce which was entitled under
the Constitution of the United States to full faith and credit.
But any explanation of the Haddock case must be consistent
with Atherton v. Atherton," in which it was held that a divorce
decree rendered in a suit in which the defendant was not per-
sonally served and did not appear was nevertheless entitled to
full faith and credit. The view of Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissenting opinion in Haddock v. Haddock, in which some of the
commentators on that case concurred, that At herton -v. Atherton
was thereby overruled in effect, must be discarded since the
court, in a unanimous opinion in the case of Thompson v.
Thompson,9 treated the two cases as distinguishable and followed
the decision of Atherton v. Athertonz. Any explanation of Had-
dock v. Haddock must, therefore, be consistent with the other
two cases to be sustainable on authority.
One theory which seems to be receiving increased recognition
at the present time is that the fault of the non-resident spouse,
which justifies the spouse domiciled within the state of the forum
in living apart from the other, is sufficient to give jurisdiction.0
Since this theory has been incorporated in the tentative draft of
the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,1 an examination of the
basis for it in the decisions and of the practical effects of its
adoption may be justified.
Some of the statements of Mr. Justice White, who wrote the
opinion of the majority in Haddock v. Haddock, tend to sup-
port this theory. In stating the sixth and seventh of the propo-
sitions which the court regards as settled by prior decisions and
on which it proposes to base its decision, the rules that the wife
may acquire a separate domicile if the husband's fault justifies
her in living apart from him, and may not acquire such domicile
if the separation is due to her fault, are recognized as deterimin-
ing whether the state in which the husband sues for divorce is
the state where both are domiciled so as to have jurisdiction
under the fifth proposition. -12 In answering the contention that
divorce was a proceeding in rem and the res was in the state
where the husband was domiciled the opinion says:
"As the husband, after wrongfully abandoning the wife in
New York, never established a matrimonial domicile in Con-
s Supra note 4.
9 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129 (1913).
I0 Beale, op. cit. supra note 7, at 420.
:1 AMuERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, flESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLIrr OF L%-s,
No. 2 (1926) § 118 (b).
12 Supra note 1, at 570-572, 26 Sup. Ct. at 527, 528.
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necticut, it cannot be said that he took with him that marital
relation from which he fled to Connecticut." 18
But the statement of facts contained in the opinion does not
warrant this language unless we treat the finding of the court
which is asked to extend faith and credit to the judgment of a
sister state as conclusive of jurisdictional facts. The opinion
states that the parties were married in New York in 1868 and
that the wife brought this action in that state in 1899 for
separation from bed and board and for alimony on the ground
of the husband's desertion; that the answer alleged that the
separation was by mutual consent and that the husband had in
1881 procured a divorce in Connecticut where he was then in
fact domiciled; that at the trial before the referee the judg-
ment roll in the Connecticut suit for divorce was excluded from
evidence and thereafter the referee found that the husband with-
out justifiable cause abandoned the wife.14 In the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brown it is stated that the complaint in
the Connecticut suit alleged a willful desertion by the wife and
the court found that to be a fact. 5
In both Atherton v. Atherton and Thompson v. Thompson the
wife left the state in which she had been living with her hus-
band and brought suit against him in another jurisdiction. In
both cases the husband set up in defense a divorce obtained by
him in the state of his domicile, which remained where he
and the wife had lived together. In both cases the court before
which the wife's suit was pending refused recognition to the
decree relied on by the husband and found that the wife was
justified in leaving the husband. The United States Supreme
Court held that the decrees were entitled to full faith and credit
and reversed the decisions for the respective wives.
If we are to conclude that there is authority for the proposi-
tion that jurisdiction to render a binding divorce decree after
only constructive service of a non-resident defendant depends
on whether the separation is due to the fault of the plaintiff
or defendant, we must find some justification for accepting in
Haddock v. Haddock the finding as to fault which was made by
the court which was asked to extend credit to a prior foreign
decree and for accepting in the other two cases the findings
made by the courts which rendered the prior decrees. If we
disregard the allegation of Haddock's answer that the separa-
tion was by mutual consent, which allegation is not referred to
in any of the opinions, the only difference in the facts in these
cases is that in the Haddock case the husband had left the wife,
13Ibid. 577, 26 Sup. Ct. at 530.
14 Ibid. 564, 565, 26 Sup. Ct. at 525.
5 Ibid. 609, 26 Sup. Ct. at 542.
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and in the other two cases the wives had left the husbands. Of
course, if the wives had deserted their husbands, the ordinary
rule is that they could not acquire separate domiciles and, there-
fore, the courts in which the husbands sued had jurisdiction
over the entire res. But it is equally true that if Mrs. Haddock
deserted her husband by refusing to accompany him into Con-
necticut, as the Connecticut court found, her domicile followed
his and Connecticut had complete jurisdiction. We are still no
nearer to the solution of the question as to which court's finding
on the issue of fault is to be accepted. On principle, it would
seem that if fault is a jurisdictional fact, the Supreme Court is
the ultimate tribunal to determine that fact, but in none of the
three decisions is there any intimation that it has made such
a determination, nor do the records, as given in the reports,
permit such a determination.
A suggestion has been made that a finding of the court which
rendered the earlier decree as to a jurisdictional fact is con-
clusive where there is substantial evidence to sustain it, and
the fact that the wife left the husband in the state where they
had been living together was sufficient in Athcrton v. Atherton
and Tlwmpson v. Thomnpson to support a finding that the fault
was hers, while there was no substantial evidence to support the
finding of the Connecticut court that Mrs. Haddock had deserted
her husband. 6 The only case 1' cited for the major premise dealt
with an attack on the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court over a
corporation based on the claim that the president of the cor-
poration was not authorized to file the petition in involuntary
bankruptcy. The court held that that question was one which
the statute gave the bankruptcy court power to determine so
that its determination, if supported by any evidence, was con-
clusive. The determination of the extent of a court's jurisdic-
tion under a particular statute depends on principles entirely
different from those which determine the jurisdiction of the
courts of a state to render a judgment which will be entitled
to full faith and credit. The United States Supreme Court has
uniformly held that a court which is asked to give credit to the
judgment of a sister state may determine whether the facts
essential to the jurisdiction of the other State existed and cannot
be concluded by any recitals in the record of the proceedings in
the other state. 8
In Thompson v. Thompson the court said:
"In the Atherton Case the matrimonial domicile was in Ken-
tucky ..... .In the Haddock Case, the husband and wife were
16 Thurber, loc. cit. supra note 5.
17 New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass and Copper Co., 91 U. S.
656 (1875).
is 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1902) § 901 and cases cited.
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domiciled in New York and the husband left her there, and,
after some years, acquired a domicile in Connecticut, and ob-
tained in that state, and in accordance with its laws, a judgment
of divorce, based upon constructive, and not actual, service of
process on the wife .... The New York court refused to give
credit to the Connecticut judgment, and this court held there
was no violation of the full faith and credit clause in the refusal,
and this because there was not at any time a matrimonial domi-
cile in the State of Connecticut, and therefore the res--the mar-
riage status--was not within the sweep of the judicial power of
that state." 1
In the opinion in the Haddock case, the court, in distinguish-
ing the Atherton case, says:
"The decision in that case, however, as we have previously
said, was expressly placed upon the ground of matrimonial
domicil." 20
None of the three opinions undertakes to state what is meant
by "matrimonial domicil" which is thus held to be an element
which gives complete jurisdiction to the state of domicile of only
one of the spouses. Considering the facts which were stressed
in distinguishing the Haddock case from the other two, it would
appear that by "matrimonial domicil" the court meant the place
where the parties last lived together as husband and wife, and
where they were legally domiciled while so living together. This
is also the meaning attributed to the term by most commentators
on the Haddock case,21 and most of the few courts which
have considered it.22 But suppose that both parties, after the
separation, have permanently left the jurisdiction in which they
last lived together; is there then any matrimonial domicile?
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Montmorency v. Mont-
morency,23 has held that the innocent party in such a case can
take the matrimonial domicile to the new domicile of that party.
If the innocent party is the husband, the question would be
unimportant so long as we adhere to the rule that the wife's
domicile follows that of the husband unless he gives her cause
'19 Supra note 9, at 561, 562, 33 Sup. Ct. at 131.
20 Supra note 1, at 584, 26 Sup. Ct. at 533.
21 Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL 49, 64;
Lewis, op. cit. supra note 6, at 856; Schofield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 232;
Bigelow, op. cit, supra note 5, at 350. Professor Beale originally under-
stood the term to have this meaning. See Beale, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 587.
22 De Bouchel v. Candler, 296 Fed. 482 (N. D. Ga. 1924); Callahan v.
Callahan, 65 Misc. 172, 121 X. Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1909); State ex rel.
Aldrach v. Morse, 31 Utah 213, 87 Pac. 705 (1906).
23 139 S. W. 1168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). This case was approved by
dictum in Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. 186, 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915). It is
also approved by Professor Beale. Op. cit. supra note 7, at 426, n. 30,
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for leaving him,2 4 for then the jurisdiction where he was domi-
ciled would be the domicile of both and its courts could render
a divorce decree binding everywhere. But if the husband deserts
the wife, he may, nevertheless, acquire a new domicile for him-
self, though it does not become her domicile. That was the
situation before the Texas court in the Mont morcney case. If
the fault of the husband were not desertion but such cruelty as
would justify the wife in leaving him, it would seem that she
might then, too, take the matrimonial domicile with her under
the reasoning of that case. But that was the situation the New
York court found to exist in Atherton v. Atherton and yet the
United States Supreme Court held, without determining the
question of fault, that the matrimonial domocile was in Ken-
tucky, where the husband remained, and not in New York, to
which state the wife had gone.
But it is not contended that courts in general have expressly
adopted the theory that fault is an element in determining di-
vorce jurisdiction, the argument is rather that the actual results
of most of the decisions are consistent with that theory,2- the
theory is sound in principle, and its express adoption would
straighten out the tangles in our law of recognition of divorce. '-
The theory is justified in principle by the argument that the
interest of the non-resident spouse cannot be affected unless that
spouse has been personally served or has submitted to the juris-
24 It is doubtful just how general today is adherence to the rule that a
wife who lives apart from her husband because of her own fault cannot
acquire a separate domicile. See AMERICAN LAw INST. CoNFLIcr op Lts
RESTATE-mNT No. 1 (1925) § 30 n. In Williamson A. Osenton, 232 U. S.
619, 625, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 443 (1914), Mr. Justice Holmes says: "The only
reason that could be offered for not recognizing the fact of the plaintiff's
[wife's] actual change [of domicile], if justified, is the now vanishing
fiction of identity of person." In Saperstone v. Saperstone, 131 N. Y. Supp.
241 (Sup. Ct. 1911), the court held that a Russian wife who continued her
journey to this country after her husband had been rejected at the port
of embarkation, intending to separate permanently from him and live here,
had acquired a domicile here so that a Russian rabbi had no jurisdiction
to grant her a divorce. See, also, in the e.xplanatory note to the restate-
ment above cited, by the director of the Institute, on p. 4, other suggested
wordings for sec. 30 which make actual separation the only prerequisite to
the wife's power to acquire a separate domicile. Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923)
§ 60-1503 and N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1166, each provide that a married
woman living in the state is a resident thereof, though her husband lives
elsewhere.
25 This is true only on the assumption that the finding of one court or
the other on the issue of fault as affecting the merits is a finding which
we can accept as determining a jurisdictional issue.
26 Beale, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421, 425, 429. This article seems to
have been written as the reporter's justification for the adoption of sec.
118 of the Restatement. See AMERtCAN LAW INSTITUTE COM=MENTIXS OX
CONFLICT OF LAWS, RESTATEMaENT No. 2 (1926) 30-=.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
diction of the court. That submission may be by appearance or
by misconduct. 7 But it is clearly a fiction to say that a husband
who deserts his wife in New York, where the law will give her
only a separation for such misconduct on his part, thereby sub-
mits his interest in the marriage relation to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Connecticut to which the wife may change her
domicile without the knowledge, or against the will, of the hus-
band. It may be that a proper balancing of the interests affected
justifies us in recognizing jurisdiction in the Connecticut court
under those circumstances to terminate his interest in the rela-
tion, but we cannot say that he has, in any real sense, submitted
his interest to the jurisdiction of that state.
One of the practical gains which will follow the adoption of
this theory of divorce jurisdiction is that the wife will be put
upon an absolute equality with her husband so far as a right
to a divorce is concerned 8 It is true that, so long as we do
not recognize the wife's right to acquire a new domicile separate
from that of her husband unless his fault justifies her in living
apart from him, she cannot obtain a divorce in a state where
she is actually residing apart from her husband unless she can
show that the separation was not due to her fault. But if the
tendency of the courts to enlarge the power to acquire a separ-
ate domicile continues,29 this inequality will soon disappear if
it has not already disappeared2 °
But the need for uniformity in recognition of divorce decrees
far outweighs any other practical consideration in dealing with
this subject. The serious, often tragic, consequences of diverse
rulings upon this question have been universally recognized.
What appear to be the probabilities that the principles of divorce
jurisdiction laid down in the Restatement will meet with such
general acceptance as to eliminate, or even lessen the discordant
views of the several states on this question? The Massachusetts
court has suggested that the adoption of the principles laid
down by the federal Supreme Court as the basis for the exercise
of inter-state comity will bring about a closer approach to unity
of decision among the several states,31 but before those prin-
ciples can be generally adopted, there must be a general agree-
ment as to what they are, and certainly there is, as yet, no
agreement that jurisdiction depends on the fault of the non-
27 Beale, op. cit. supra note 7, at 425.
28 Ibid. 429.
29 See supra note 24.
30 Even New York has recognized a divorce granted ex parte to a wife in
a state where she was living apart from her husband without determining
whose fault led to the separation. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126
N. E. 508 (1920).
31 See Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 82, 87, 113 N. E. 841, 843 (1916).
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resident spouse32  On the contrary, Thompson v. Tizompson fur-
nishes strong authority for arguing that the federal Supreme
Court does not so hold, even if we concede that such a holding
might be deduced from the language of Haddock v. Haddock.
There is little evidence as yet that courts which before the
decision of Haddock v. Hvddock recognized foreign divorces in
all cases where one spouse was domiciled bona fide in the state
where, the decree was rendered are manifesting any tendency
now to refuse that recognition. In the Massachusetts case last
referred to, recognition was refused where the Massachusetts
court found that the wife was not at fault, and she had had no
notice of the proceedings by which her erring husband obtained
a divorce in another jurisdiction where he was then domiciled
bona fide. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals apparently has
adopted the rule of Haddock v. Haddock as the test of jurisdic-
tion to grant divorce 3 The Utah court found it unnecessary
to decide whether its jurisdiction was limited to cases where its
decree was entitled to full faith and credit, for it found the mat-
rimonial domicile to have been in Utah.34 In other cases the
courts have apparently been unaffected by the Haddock case
except in so far as it has compelled them to extend recognition
which they formerly refused to excend.3 In at least one state
a statute was enacted after the decision of Haddock v. Haddock
validating divorce decrees rendered in any state in conformity
to the law thereof.:6
In view of these cases, it requires a high degree of optimism
to entertain much hope that the Restatement will induce a uni-
form practice in all jurisdictions to refuse recognition to divorce
decrees unless such recognition is required under the Haddock
case as there interpreted.
But even if all our courts should accept the principle that
jurisdiction to grant a divorce on constructive service depends
upon the fault of the non-resident, non-appearing spouse, we
should still be far from the desired goal of uniform recognition
3 Supra notes 21, 22.
33 Montmorency v. Montmorency, supra note 23.
34 State ex rel. Aldrach v. Morse, supra note 22.
35 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 296, and cases cited in n. 32. The
Georgia case of Solomon v. Solomon cited in that note as rcquiring actual
knowledge of the suit by the absent defendant followed without argument
the case of Matthews v. Matthews, 139 Ga. 123, 76 S. E. 855 (1912), where
the refusal to recognize the Alabama decree involved was based on the
ground of the wife's fraud in claiming a domicile in Alabama and in stating
her husband's whereabouts were unknown, as a result of which he was not
given the personal notice of the suit required by the Alabama law.
36 Kan. Laws 1907, c. 184, § 1; McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Ran. 31,
107 Pac. 546 (1910). A similar statute of Indiana was enacted before the
Haddock decision. Hilbish v. Hattle, 145 Ind. 59, 44 N. E. 20 (1896).
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of divorces. As an issue of fact, the question of fault is one
difficult to determine. It is probable that the case does not often
arise where the fault is all one one side. In many cases it is
almost impossible to say who is most at fault even if all the
acts of the parties are known. It would not be surprising to find
that the courts will differ as to this question of fault. They did
differ in Atherton v. Atherton, Haddock v. Haddock, and Thomp-
son v. Thompson. The issue of fault, like any other jurisdic-
tional fact, could then only be determined by the United States
Supreme Court. Surely we ought to hesitate before we adopt a
rule which would impose on that court the obligation of deter-
mining such a difficult issue of fact whenever it is claimed that
a state court has refused full faith and credit to a foreign divorce
granted without jurisdiction over the person of one of the par-
ties. Such cases would probably be more frequent than they
have been in the past, since it is suggested that, to insure uni-
formity, recognition be refused except where it is required under
the suggested rule.37 Certainly it would seem to be contrary
to wise social engineering to occupy the time of that court with
the decision of mere issues of fact unless such a burden must
be imposed to avoid the evil of diverse holdings in different
states as to the validity of a divorce.
Furthermore, the issue of recognition of divorce must often
be determined after the death of one 38 or both "I of the parties
to the marriage relationship. In these cases it will generally be
impossible for any court to determine the issue of fault unless
the examination is limited to the more or less public conduct of
the parties, and it is obvious that a finding based on an examin-
ation so limited would frequently be contrary to the actual facts.
It is still considered good form in most social groups for a
husband and wife to treat each other with courtesy in public,
whatever happens in private. Merely to learn which spouse
committed the first public breach of the marriage relation gives
no clue as to the real fault of the parties, except, probably, where
the breach is an act of adultery.
But not only does the suggested theory of jurisdiction require
the solution of difficult questions of fact; it also requires the
ascertainment of principles of law for the determination of
which there seems to be no practical machinery available. What
law is to determine the degree of matrimonial fault which bars
a spouse from objecting to the other's acquisition of a separate
3
7 Beale, op. cit. supra note 7, at 428.38 E.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct 237 (1903) ; Hil-
bish v. Hattle, supra note 36; Howard v. Strode, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S. W.
792 (1912); Hubbard v. Hubbard, supra note 30; Douglas v. Teller, 53
Wash. 695, 102 Pac. 761 (1909).
39 E.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888).
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home? It is probably safe to assume that it is not intended that
the fault shall necessarily be sufficient to entitle the other spouse
to an absolute divorce. A fault which is ground for divorce
from bed and board or for judicial separation would seem to
satisfy the requirement. If we should limit the meaning of
"fault" to desertion, we should still be confronted with conflict-
ing state rules as to what constitutes desertion."° The obvious
answer to this objection is that if fault is an element of juris-
diction essential to entitle a divorce decree to full faith and
credit under the federal constitution, it is for the United States
Supreme Court to determine the legal content of the term. But
on what basis is the court to make that determination? At the
time the Constitution was adopted there was no common law
as to jurisdiction to divorce, and certainly none as to jurisdic-
tion where the spouses had separate domiciles, for the right
of the wife to acquire a separate domicile was not recognized
until much later. The difficulty cannot be met by legislation,
for no legislative body has power to act. The state legislatures,
of course, cannot determine what gives jurisdiction in the federal
sense. Congress has been given no power to determine what
judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, it can only pre-
scribe the method of authentication and the effect of such judg-
ments as are within the constitution2l Without a constitutional
amendment, the only way to determine the legal content of the
term "fault" would be by the Supreme Court's applying its con-
ception of the "general law" of marital relationships to the var-
ious concrete factual situations presented by the successive cases
brought before it. In the twenty years since Haddock v. Had-
dock was decided there has been only one case taken to the
Supreme Court involving the problem of recognition of foreign
divorce decrees. Even if the number of cases were increased
twenty-fold by the adoption of the suggested jurisdictional test,
a result to be deprecated rather than desired, it is manifest that
we should have to wait a long time before we had any clear
idea as to what "fault" meant .42 It is probable that our social
views as to the causes for divorce would change more rapidly
than this cumbersome process could at all adequately delimit the
scope of the term as we understand it today. If the development
of the law by the judicial process is too slow to keep pace with
changing social and economic views on questions that are daily
presented to our courts, how can we expect it to function ade-
4 0 KE-EZ MAIAGmE AND DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) c. 21.
-n U. S. CoNsT., Art. IV, § 1.
42 It should be remembered that on this question the lower federal courts
could not aid the Supreme Court in working out the legal content of the
term "fault." Denial of full faith and credit is not ground for removal
from a state court to a lower federal court.
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quately in a field where the social viewpoint is changing as
rapidly as it has been in recent years with reference to divorce,
and where only one case has been presented in twenty years in
which the law can be authoritatively declared? To hope that
in such a situation we could achieve uniformity of decision as to
recognition of foreign divorces is to disregard all the lessons of
recent legal experience.
Not only would the proposed theory fail to give us uniformity
of recognition of foreign divorces, but there is great reason to
fear that it would result in greater divergence than exists today.
The great majority of our states prior to the decision of Had-
dock v. Haddock recognized any foreign divorce where one of
the parties was bona fide domiciled in the state which rendered
the decree.43 The only states in which a tendency has been ob-
served to restrict recognition since that case was decided are
Massachusetts 44 and Texas.45 If other considerations were equal
it would seem that there would be more probability of securing
a uniform recognition of the view held by the majority of courts
rather than the view of the minority. But the minority courts
do not agree among themselves as to the rule they will follow.
The situation is that we have a majority of the courts agreed
upon one rule, and a small minority rejecting that rule in whole
or in part and each adopting a different rule for its guidance. 4"
There is no reason to believe that any of these courts would be
more willing to accept the rule of another minority court than
they are to accept that of the majority.
In a restatement of the conflict of laws there is no need to
43 Beale, op. cit. supra note 5, at 587; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at
295, 296.
44 Perkins v. Perkins, supra note 31.
45 In Parker v. Parker, supra note 23, the court determined that such
was the result of the Texas cases which had determined the extent of their
own jurisdiction to grant divorce in accordance with the principles of
Haddock v. Haddock.
46 For example, Perkins v. Perkins, supra note 44, interprets the Haddock
case as requiring that the parties have lived together in the state where
the decree was rendered; Montmorency v. Montmorency, sUpra note 23,
interprets it as vesting jurisdiction in the state where the innocent party
was domiciled. New York has apparently adopted the view that her
public policy forbids recognition of a divorce affecting her own citizens
except for adultery. Consequently, whenever she can, she refuses such
recognition. Hubbard v. Hubbard, supra note 30. Though she will recog-
nize a foreign divorce granted in a jurisdiction where both parties tem-
porarily resided, and where the ground of divorce was adultery, notwith-
standing the fact that both parties were at the time legally domiciled in
New York. Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923). In the
recent case of Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (1925), Judge
Cardozo suggested a different basis for the recognition of foreign decrees,
but it is not certain that a majority of the court agreed with him.
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reconcile the position taken with Haddock v. Haddock. That
case deals with a question of constitutional law, and it expressly
refuses to decide what recognition each state should give a for-
eign divorce decree.-I The latter is the proper question for con-
flict of laws, and while, ordinarily, the constitution requires full
faith and credit to be given to a judgment of a sister state if
the principles of conflict of laws require recognition of a foreign
judgment under similar circumstances, it does not necessarily
follow that an interpretation of the constitutional clause by the
United States Supreme Court, which eliminates from the oper-
ation of that clause cases entitled to recognition under the prin-
ciples of the conflict of laws, requires us to narrow the scope
of those principles to correspond.
It would seem that there ought to be no dissent from the
proposition that courts should recognize as valid all foreign
judgments rendered under circumstances which they would con-
sider sufficient to give themselves jurisdiction under the common
law.48 In Haddock v. Haddock it is said that all of the states
with the possible exception of Rhode Island recognize the power
to decree divorce based on mere domicile of the plaintiff, al-
though the decree will be valid only within the state where ren-
dered.49 If we accept this as true, then the statutes of the
various states prescribing the conditions under which the di-
vorce will be granted, generally by fixing the time during which
the plaintiff must have resided within the state before beginning
suit,50 are limitations on existing jurisdiction. In view of this
unanimity it would seem to be plain that the only basis on which
we can reasonably hope to secure an agreement as to recognition
of foreign divorce decrees is this basis on which the states are
so well agreed that the jurisdiction of each to grant a divorce
rests.
It is, of course, apparent that the most frequent cases under
the existing situation where parties find themselves divorced in
47 Supra note 1, at 605, 26 Sup. Ct. at 542.
48 Situations where a binding statute requires a court to exercise juris-
diction which it would otherwise consider did not belong to it are excluded.
Cf. Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155 (1870).
49 SUpra note 1, at 603, 26 Sup. Ct. at 541.
50 See summary of divorce statutes in KEEZER, op. cit. supra note 40, at
651-742. Massachusetts alone requires that the parties shall have lived to-
gether in the state. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1147 requires either that both
parties be residents; that they were married within the state; that plain-
tiff resided in the state when the offense was committed and when the
action was commenced; or that the offense was committed in the state and
the injured party was a resident when the action was commenced. It is
obvious that under these provisions divorce decrees could be rendered in
many cases which were not entitled to full faith and credit under any of
the principles stated in the Haddock case.
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one state and married in another arise where the divergent views
are not those of two different states as to the recognition of a
divorce granted by a third state,51 but where a divorce recog-
nized as valid in the state where it is granted is refused recog-
nition in another state. Therefore, to meet the greatest need
for uniformity we must either adopt as the rule of conflict of
laws the rule of jurisdiction, or, after securing agreement as
to a different rule for the conflict of laws, secure also a sub-
stitution of that rule for the rule of jurisdiction now so nearly
universally accepted. The only possibility of such a substitution
is by the authority of the United States Supreme Court. But
that court has frequently recognized the local validity of divorces
obtained in accordance with the rule that domicile of only one
party is necessary, and it expressly reiterated that position in
Haddock v. Haddock.52 It is true that the statement there was
dictum in the sense that the court was not called upon to decide
whether the Connecticut decree was valid in Connecticut, but it
was not obiter, for it was the basis on which the court dis-
tinguished from the case at bar a previous case 13 which it not
only did not overrule, but expressly approved as still sound law.
Certainly that statement will prevent the Haddock case from
being very effective in inducing the states to abandon their ac-
cepted views as to jurisdiction to grant a divorce which will be
valid within their own borders. Most of them will feel bound
by their statutes, previously held valid, until there is an authori-
tative decision that those statutes violate the federal Con-
stitution.
The objection that the majority view, if generally adopted,
will lead to a race of diligence in different states is not sufficient
to outweigh the advantage it possesses of securing uniformity
of holding as to the validity of divorce. 4 The objection is not
51 It is safe to assume that in this situation most states would follow
Ball v. Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106 (1921), in holding that the
decision of the state of the domicile of the defendant in the divorce proceed-
ings as to the status resulting from the divorce would be followed else-
where. Cf. Armitage v. Attorney General [1906] Prob. 135.
52 Supra note 1, at 569, 26 Sup. Ct. at 527.
53 Maynard v. Hill, supra note 39.
54 Haddock v. Haddock, supra note 1, at 580, 26 Sup. Ct. at 532. The
court here is manifestly concerned about the general situation, not the
particular case. Mr. and Mrs. Haddock had separated immediately after
the marriage ceremony by consent, according to his statement which seems
to accord with the other facts, and had never lived together. Thirteen
years after the ceremony the Connecticut divorce decree was rendered, and
eighteen years later Mrs. Haddock brought her suit in New York. By no
stretch of the imagination could that be called a "race" of diligence. Very
much of the language of the prevailing opinion indicates the decision was
based on the general feeling of opposition to the practice of seeking states
with lax divorce laws, a practice which it seems could have been much
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so serious as appears on the surface. In very few of the cases
where one spouse has sought another state solely to obtain a
divorce would there be much difficulty in establishing that there
was no domicile in that state and, therefore, no jurisdiction to
render a decree which is valid where it was rendered or any-
where else. While determining the issue of domicile before the
decree is granted may involve a difficult decision as to intent,
the intent is generally manifest before the question of foreign
recognition of the decree arises. If it could be impressed upon
those seeking divorce that the decree is worthless, though it may
bear the seal of an established court, unless there was a bona
fide domicile, as distinguished from a mere compliance with
certain technical requirements to show residence, the practice
of selecting a favorable jurisdiction to obtain divorce would be
greatly checked if not entirely stopped. But when we see parties
accepting and paying for decrees rendered by a foreign court
which has no semblance of jurisdiction, it is, perhaps, too much
to hope they can be convinced that a decree of any court is not
sufficient. However, if the courts are agreed as to what is a
valid decree, it may be that in time the rule so agreed upon will
become part of the common knowledge of the people.
It would seem that the weight of authority on the conflict of
laws question, the commonly accepted theory of divorce suits,
and practical considerations all unite in sustaining the prin-
ciple that domicile of one spouse gives jurisdiction to divorce.
It may well be that due process of law requires some better
notice than mere publication of summons. If we accept the
proposition that it is also a principle of the conflict of laws that
judicial jurisdiction over a status cannot be exercised unless a
method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated
to give interested persons knowledge of the proceeding and an
opportunity to be heard,55 it would seem to follow that publica-
tion would be insufficient5 Where the res within the jurisdic-
tion is tangible, there is reason to hold that the owner must take
notice of proceedings where that res is situated, but where it
is a status which may be affected by decree in any jurisdiction
better dealt with by a recognition, as in Andrews v. Andrews, aupra note
38, that such decrees were void where rendered and, of course, not entitled
to full faith and credit in other states.
5 .AxERIAN LAw INST., RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLICT OP LAWS, No. 2
(1926) § 115. Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N. E. 1113 (1913),
would seem to be authority for the application of a similar principle to
the exercise by a foreign court of jurisdiction to render a personal judg-
ment against a subject of the foreign state.
56 In McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 (1917), it was
held that publication was not a sufficient service in an action in personam
against one domiciled within the state but absent therefrom, even though
there was jurisdiction.
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where the other party to the relationship may acquire a domicile,
we may well require notice to be given. There would probably
be no disagreement from the proposition that publication of sum-
mons, as ordinarily made, results in no notice to anyone. With
this restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction, which has been
voluntarily adopted in some states, the most serious objection
to divorce in a state where only one party is domiciled would be
eliminated. Then we might reasonably expect that all states
might be willing to apply to the recognition of foreign divorces
the same jurisdictional tests they apply to their own power to
grant divorce and thereby the number of anomalous situations
of marital relations changing as parties crossed state lines would
be reduced to a minimum.
